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I.1 Introduction to the study 
 
Numerous studies have pointed to low saving rates as a serious constraint to growth in 
Latin America.2  During the last twenty years, per capita GDP growth averaged about one 
percent in Latin America and almost 5 percent in East Asia.3  Over the same period, saving rates 
stagnated in Latin America--where they remained at around 17 percent of GDP--and nearly 
doubled in East Asia, where they rose to over 35 percent.  The link between low saving rates and 
a poor growth preformance is not limited to these two regions--Sub Saharan Africa’s “growth 
tragedy” is often partially blamed on that continent’s low level of saving.4  Not surprisingly, 
throughout much of Latin America and elsewhere in the world a wide-ranging spectrum of 
policies have been either implemented or are being considered with the aim of stimulating 
saving.  Some policies have sought to reduce distortions in the financial sector that may depress 
                                                 
1 The authors would like to thank Michael Gavin and Vincent Reinhart for useful comments and 
suggestions. 
2 See Edwards (1995) and Schmidt-Hebbel and Servén (1997). 
3 See Schmidt-Hebbel, Servén, and Solimano (1996). 
4 See World Bank (19xx). 
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saving, others have explicitly targeted saving through a variety of tax incentives, another set of 
policies have emcompassed ambitious reforms of entitlements programs and pension schemes. 
Early theories posited a causal chain from saving to growth.  In the 1960s and 1970s, 
proponents of financial liberalization, such as McKinnon (1973) and Shaw (1973), sought to 
promote saving by allowing for positive, market-determined real rates of return.  The higher 
level of saving, in turn, was thought to support a higher level of investment and growth.  This 
line of analysis gave impetus to policy prescriptions that called for a liberalization of the 
financial system that did away with directed credit policies and interest rate controls.  Many 
countries, under the auspices of multilateral institutions, implemented ambitious reforms of their 
financial systems. Yet, much of the recent empirical evidence has called into question the 
implications of those theories, suggesting that the chain of causation runs from growth to saving 
and not the other way around.5  Indeed, the evidence from Latin America fits that pattern rather 
well.6  Furthermore, recent experiences with financial liberalization, including that of the United 
States during the 1980s and several of the episodes that are discussed in this volume, suggest that 
financial liberalization may ease pre-existing credit constraints and actually reduce saving. 
Some authors have suggested that the evidence hints at the existence of virtuous circles 
of saving and growth and poverty traps of undersaving and stagnation.  Reports published by the 
Inter-American Development Bank (1996 and 1997) indicate that many of the reform programs 
implemented in Latin America over the past decade have been designed to activate virtuous 
                                                 
5 See Deaton (1989) and Carroll and Weil (1993). 
6 A recent report by the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB, 1996) examined the link between the 
average saving rates of Caribbean, Central and South American countries during 1991-1995 and the average real 
GDP growth in the preceding 10 years; the stylized evidence suggests a strong and positive correlation from growth 
to saving. 
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circles.  Recent financial crises notwithstanding, the successful development experience in East 
Asia lends credence to the notion of virtuous circles, but it begs the question as to whether Latin 
American can duplicate the East Asian experience.   
Seven of the case studies collected in this volume provide insights into that and other 
related policy questions by examining what drives saving in Latin America.  The studies cover 
Argentina, Chile, Colombia,  Mexico, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela and span a variety of topics 
ranging from assessing the impact of financial liberalization on saving to determining the role of 
terms of trade shocks.  Many of the studies also employ new data sources, that provide a better 
understanding of the saving patterns of the various agents in the economy--the public sector, 
firms, and households.  All too often past studies have relied on highly aggregated data masking 
important differences across these sectors. Three of studies analyze the European experience 
(Italy, Spain, and the United Kingdom) with liberalization and structural reforms and its effects 
on saving.  The aim of these studies is to provide insights as to what Latin American countries 
can expect in the wake of structural reform. 
Beyond describing past and present trends in saving across a spectrum of primarily Latin 
American countries, the studies that comprise this volume also analyze many topical issues that 
remain the subject of much debate in academic and policy circles.  What is the relationship 
between private and public saving?  Can changes in public saving be expected to influence 
aggregate domestic saving?  If not, the case for fiscal austerity, so prevalent in adjustment 
programs, may well be undermined.  Most of the studies in this volume address these questions 
by examining the evidence on Ricardian equivalence, or whether the private sector fully 
internalizes and offsets the actions of the public sector.  
 
 4 
Many countries in Latin America and elsewhere have either undergone, or are 
contemplating, full or partial financial liberalization.  Recent studies have shown that financial 
liberalization is usually accompanied by greater access to credit and, more often than not, by 
credit booms.7  Macroeconomists and policy makers have long sought to understand what 
happens to private saving when there are financial sector reforms.  To shed light on this issue, 
several of the studies in the chapters that follow examine the prevalence of liquidity constraints, 
the presence of a credit channel, and the role of asset price and consumption booms in explaining 
saving.  One of the studies offers an innovative look at what drives durable goods consumption.  
This line of work is rich in policy implications.  If financial liberalization activates a cycle of 
booming credit and consumption--presumably leading to widening current account imbalances 
and increasing the possibility of a financial crisis--is it desirable? If it is desirable, on the basis of 
efficiency considerations, what are the necessary prerequisites? Is there an optimal sequencing? 
As noted, an earlier literature on the links between saving and growth emphasized the 
need for high saving rates, so as to finance higher investment and serve as the engine of 
economic growth.8  Yet, the newer studies suggest that it is growth that drives saving.  The 
outcome of this debate is filled with policy implications and many of the country studies in this 
volume bring new evidence to bear on this key issue.  If high saving is the “passive” outcome of 
growth, then policy makers should be less concerned with policies aimed at stimulating saving 
per se and, instead, focus on those policies that foster growth through more direct channels.  The 
vast literature on endogenous growth offers some leading candidates in this regard, ranging from 
                                                 
7 See Gavin and Hausman (1996) and Kaminsky and Reinhart (1996). 
8 See, for instance, McKinnon and Shaw (197 ). 
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keeping inflation under control to improving education and reducing taxation.9   
                                                 
9 See Easterly (19xx). 
As in the preivious empirical literature on saving, the studies in this volume also provide 
evidence on the relationship between saving and its traditional determinants, including 
demographic factors associated with the life-cycle hypothesis (LCH), terms-of-trade shocks, 
foreign saving, and income inequality.  On the issue of foreign saving, several of the studies 
assess to what extent capital inflows “crowd out” domestic saving.  If capital inflows are fickle 
and volatile and the extent of crowding out is large--is there a case for capital controls on 
inflows?  Should policy makers aim to influence how these capital flows are intermediated? 
Three of the studies also have much to say about the impact of pension reform on saving and one 
of the studies (Noya, Lorenzo, and Grau-Pérez, 1998) examines the determinants of public 
saving.  While the bulk of the evidence presented in this book comes from macroeconomic data, 
four of the studies also draw inference from neglected micro data based on surveys of 
households and firms. 
The remainder of this chapter proceeds as follows.  The next section briefly reviews the 
stylized facts of saving in Latin America and its components; this section provides some 
descriptive background on trends and cycles in saving rates and their volatility, while Section I.3 
sketches some of the key factors, analyzed in detail in the individual studies, that help explain 
why saving rates evolved the way they did.  The concluding section summarizes and touches on 
the policy implications of some of the findings. 
 
 I.2 Saving and Its Components: The Styllzed Facts 
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This section discusses some of the data issues relevant to the analysis of saving, it 
provides a rough description of the features saving in eight Latin American countries, analyzes 
the trends in saving and its components, and selectively summarizes what the studies have to 
offer to explain its evolution in recent years. 
 
I.2.1 Data issues 
Saving data are generally calculated in questionable ways, mostly as residuals of other 
macroeconomic variables.10  Measurement error is often compounded by failing to correct for 
capital gains/losses and unrecorded capital flight.  There is considerable variation in estimated 
saving rates among alternative sources of data.  In what follows, unless otherwise noted, all the 
descriptive analysis is based on the original data provided by the authors.  Hence, it is based on 
data that have been, to the extent possible, corrected for some of the problems that typically 
plague data on saving.  Because the sample period is not uniform across countries and not all 
countries have equally dissaggregated data, the data appendix gives details as to the pertinent 
sample period used.  The case studies provide a richer discussion of the individual databases.  
 
I.2.2 Descriptive statistics 
Table I.1 presents basic descriptive statistics for the various definitions of saving defined 
in the previous section.  We report the mean, standard deviation, maximum and minimum values, 
as well as the coefficient of variation for each variable.  There are several features worth noting: 
                                                 
10 For a detailed description of recurrent measurement problems see Edwards (1995), Schmidt-Hebbel and 
Servén (1997), and Held and Uthoff (1995) for a Latin American sample. 
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First, mean domestic saving rates have oscillated in these eight countries from a 
minimum of -2.8 percent for El Salvador to a high of 39.3 for Venezuela, highlighting a 
considerable degree of variation both across countries and across time.  El Salvador, the poorest 
country in the sample, records the lowest mean saving rate, 9.9 percent, and one-half to two-
thirds the saving rate of the remaining countries.  This disparity is consistent with the predictions 
of a subsistence model of consumption (see Ogaki, Ostry, and Reinhart, 1996), which suggests a 
marked non-linear relationship between saving rates and income.  A country where income is 
close to the cost of a subsistence consumption basket will save little; as the gap between 
subsistence needs and income widens saving rates increase sharply at first and then flatten out 
with further increments to income.  Unlike East Asia, none of the countries in the sample show 
mean domestic saving rates above twenty-five percent.  Indeed, the mean for the entire sample is 
about 17 percent. 
Second, if domestic saving has oscillated in a wide range, we can find part of the 
explanation in the behavior of fiscal policy.  Public saving has recorded lows of  -7.0 percent in 
Peru and highs of 20 percent in Venezuela.  The volatility of public saving is highlighted in the 
study on Argentina (see López Murphy, et. al., 1998 this volume).  On average public saving 
across all the countries has averaged around 3 percent (and the mean is negative for two 
countries), or about 18 percent of national saving and well below the 25 to 40 percent range 
recorded for Asia.  Hence, the inability of Latin American governments to generate substantial 
saving in part explain the flat profile of saving in several countries in the region.  Taken together, 
the volatile behavior of fiscal saving, its relatively low level, and evidence on the procyclicality 
of fiscal policy in Latin America (see, for instance Gavin and Perotti, 1998) all suggest that lax 
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and erratic fiscal policy may go long way toward explaining the region’s relatively low saving 
levels.  Indeed, some studies have shown the volatility of fiscal policy in Latin America is 
associated with monetary and financial instability--factors which can only stimulate capital flight 
and reduce domestic saving rates.11 
Third, as to who contributes to private saving, the household or the firm, the data (for the 
subsample of countries for which it is available) provide no conclusive evidence.  In Colombia 
and Peru, it is households that account for the bulk of private saving while for Chile and Mexico 
the largest contributors are firms.  Pension reform notwithstanding, households on average have 
negative saving rates in Chile.  In two of the four cases where disaggregated data is available, 
household saving is more volatile than that of firms.  In one case they are equally volatile, and in 
the remaining case the opposite is true.  Hence, it is also not possible to draw firm conclusions 
on the volatility issue.  However, to the extent that consumption-smoothing considerations are 
dominant in household decisions, it should not be surprising to find that the volatility of 
household saving is greater than that of firms. 
Fourth, foreign saving also appears to be volatile across countries and across time.  
While data for Chile and Uruguay were not reported, the oscillations in foreign saving for the 
remaining sample range from about seven percent capital outflows to over nine percent capital 
inflows.  The amplitude of the cycle is large, but the contribution of foreign saving to national 
saving is modest, never reaching 3 percent of GDP; on average for the six countries for which 
we had data, it is slightly over one percent of GDP.  Hence, if foreign saving does not increase 
national saving by much, on average, it certainly contributes to its volatility.  Combined, these 
                                                 
11 See Inter-American Development Bank (1995 and 1997) and studies cited therein. 
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two observations call into question the desirability of capital inflows. 
Lastly, and not surprisingly in light of the preceding discussion, private saving is the 
largest component of domestic and national saving and the most stable.  Its coefficient of 
variation is consistently well below those recorded for both public and foreign saving.  Because 
investment projects typically require long-term financing, this observation may, in part, help 
account why saving-investment correlations have typically been high. 
 
I.2.3 Trends in saving and its components 
Previous studies have suggested that the disparity in saving rates between Latin America 
and East Asia can be traced to secular developments affecting demographics, fiscal policy, 
growth, and marked regional differences in the extent of financial deepening.12  Here, we pursue 
this line of enquiry.  In order to answer the questions as to why have saving rates stagnated in 
Latin America and is there scope increasing saving over the immediate horizon, it is important to 
assess the past trends were for the various sectors.  Tables I.2 and I.3 and the Appendix Charts 
address this issue.  With the exception of Chile (where saving shows a marked secular increase 
of over 21 percentage points between 1974 and 1994) and Mexico (where saving shows a secular 
decline, falling over 13 percentage points in the same period), domestic saving rates in the region 
have remained essentially flat.  However, before interpreting this as a common regional 
characteristic, it is worth noting that aggregate saving remained flat--but for different reasons. 
Table 1.2 highlights some of the findings of the studies on this issue.  For instance, public saving 
has been trending downward throuout the sample in a pronounced way in Argentina and Mexico-
                                                 
12 See, for instance, Edwards (1995) and Faruqee and Hussain (1995). 
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-contributing to the downward trend in the aggregate saving rate (Table I.2). Yet, in Venezuela 
and Uruguay, where the aggregate saving rate has also declined, public saving has been flat or 
actually increased.  In an attempt to further synthesize the information in Table I.2 and the 
charts, we constructed a matrix that divided public and private saving into three categories; 
downward trend, trendless, and upward trend.  If a “common regional” picture of Latin 
American saving rates were to characterize the cross-country experience, then we should expect 
the bulk of the cases would fall into two cells, for instance flat public saving and downward 
trend in private saving.  Instead, what we observe in Table I.3 is that there does not appear to be 
a representative pattern to the trends in public and private saving.  Furthermore, what accounts 
for the evolution of private saving, households or firms also diverges across countries. These 
observations suggest that “regional” explanations of the trends in Latin American saving rates 
may be of limited usefulness. 
To explore this possibility further, we conducted principal component analysis on several 
measures of the aggregate saving rates across countries and across time.  We begin with six time 
series on saving (for the countries for which we had data) for the period 1980 to 1993 for 
domestic saving and the 1975-1993 period for national saving.  A broader set of countries and 
longer sample (1970 to 1995), based on an alternative data set from the World Bank will also be 
examined.  Principal components can describe the co-movement in time series.   From the 
original series, we construct a smaller set of series, the principal components, so as to explain as 
much of the variation in the original series as possible.  The higher the degree of comovement 
that exists among the original series, the fewer the number of principal components needed to 
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explain a large share of the variation in the original series.13  
Tables I.5 to I.7 present the results from this exercise for the two measures of domestic 
saving, the data provided by the studies in this volume and World Bank data, and national 
saving.  As the correlation matrix highlights, saving rates across countries in the region are not 
all moving in the same direction.  The incidence of negative correlations is also fairly high.  
Furthermore, the correlations are sensitive to the choice of sample--the longer the sample the 
weaker the degree of comovement.  For instance, for the 1980-1993 period, which weighs 
heavily the debt crisis years, the first principal component explains 53 percent of the total 
variation in the original domestic saving series.  For national saving over a slightly longer 
sample which adds the years 1975 to 1979 to the previous sample, the R2 is 46 percent and the 
first principal component explains less than half of the total variation of the original series.  
Lastly, for the 1970-1995 period and the full sample of countries the first principal component 
explains only 38 percent of the variation in saving.  Hence, even in the aggregate data, a strong 
regional pattern does not emerge.  By contrast, the same exercise for a group of (formerly) 
rapidly-growing Asian economies yields very different results, with the first principal component 
explaining anywhere between 65 to 75 percent of the variation in the original series, depending 
                                                 
13 For instance, if all the original series were identical, then the first principal component would explain 
100 percent of the variation of the original series.  At the other extreme if the original series show no comovement 
whatsoever, then nothing would be gained by looking at common factors. 
The procedure begins by standardizing the variables, so that each series has zero mean and a unit standard 
deviation.  This standardization ensures that all series receive uniform treatment and that the construction of the 
principal component indices will not be disproportionately influenced by the series exhibiting the largest variation. 
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on the sample period used.14 
                                                 
14 Indonesia, South Korea, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand. 
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The degree of regional comovement in domestic and national saving rates is considerably 
lower than that found among external variables, such as foreign exchange reserves and real 
exchange rates.  Perhaps, the results are not surprising in light of the idiosyncratic nature of 
many of the shocks that have influenced saving rates over the course of the years in these 
countries.  For example, as noted in Rivera-Campos (1998), the civil unrest in El Salvador 
during 1979 to 1983 led to an output collapse, where GDP per capita fell at a rate of 1.9 percent 
per year during that period.  Given the links between growth and saving, no doubt, this had a 
major influence on saving.  Similarly, the oil shocks had a very different impact on oil-rich 
Venezuela than on the other countries.15  Not surprisingly, private saving rates recorded their 
highest readings following the hikes in oil prices in the 1970s and fell markedly in the 1980s as 
oil prices collapsed. 
 
I.2.4.  Common cycles? 
While the trends are heterogeneous, a common regional characteristic appears to emerge  
in the cyclical deviations around those divergent trends.  Reinhart and Talvi (1997) show that the 
common cycle in domestic and foreign saving is not confined to the region and, indeed, cuts 
across developing countries in other regions.  For instance as shown in Table I.8, the correlation 
between the cyclical components of domestic saving among Asia and Latin America is in the 
0.40 to 0.51 range, depending on the detrending method used, and is statistically significant; a 
very similar result is shown for the cycles in capital flows (i.e. foreign saving).   
                                                 
15 See Zambrano et.al.  (1998 this volume). 
One example emerges from the debt crisis (see Chart I.1).  In the initial and most severe 
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stages of the debt crisis in the early 1980s, domestic saving rates fall either back to trend or 
below trend.  This would, of course be consistent with the permanent income hypothesis, if the 
sharp decline in incomes at that time was seen as partially transitory.  A second example of a 
regional cyclical pattern emerges from the early 1990s, when the region emerged from its debt 
crisis and regained access to international capital markets.  As noted in several of the studies and 
summarized in Table I.2 under the heading “Recent Developments,” private saving rates in 
Argentina, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Peru, and Uruguay fell to either trend level (Chile) or 
below trend (the rest).  The relaxation of liquidity constraints or upward revisions to the 
expected path of future income may be consistent with the observed phenomenon.  Whatever the 
explanation, our conclusion is that, despite the broad variations in the trend and level of saving 
rates, Latin American countries share regional forces. 
As to what may account for a common cycle, there are alternative possible explanations.  
First, as argued in Calvo, Leiderman, and Reinhart (1993), capital flows (foreign saving) may be 
responding to a shared international factor, such as international interest rates.  A relaxation in 
international borrowing constraints may, in turn, fuel a consumption boom.  Secondly, and not 
inconsistent with the previous explanation, the timing of structural reforms, including trade and 
financial sector liberalization may, to a large degree, coincide across countries in the region (see 
Inter-American Development Bank, 1996 and 1997) and produce concerted cycles of saving and 
dissaving.16 
                                                 
16 This issue is taken up in the next section of this chapter and discussed in detail in several of the studies. 
The lessons from the European experience, as to what happens to saving in the wake of 
liberalization and structural reform, are mixed.  According to the findings of the authors, 
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financial liberalization (and in the case of Spain also trade liberalization) is thought to be an 
explanation behind the decline in private saving for Italy and the United Kingdom.  Yet, in the 
case of Spain, the authors argue that, once controlling for revisions to the path of expected 
income following the reforms, the behavior of private saving is well accounted for.  This result 
leads them to conclude financial liberalization, per se, did little to reduce or eliminate any prior 
credit constraints that may have existed. 
 
 I.3  Issues and Lessons: Evidence from the Case Studies 
This section provides a brief overview of some the themes that cut across the case 
studies.  We focus on the key questions addressed in these studies as regards the role of fiscal 
policy, the impact of financial liberalization, the extent of crowding out between domestic saving 
and capital inflows, and the effect of income distribution on saving.  We also re-examine the 
evidence on the causal patterns between growth and saving.  We begin this section by spelling 
out some basic concepts and measures of saving consistently used throughout the studies, 
proceed to describe the particular issue at hand in general terms, and conclude by summarizing 
the results from the country studies while making reference to the existing literature on the 
subject where relevant. 
 
I.3.1 Basic Concepts 
National saving (Sn), is the portion of disposable income not devoted to consumption or 
government purchases.  From the basic national income identities it can be shown that national 
saving is the sum of investment (I) and the current account balance (CA).  Given that policy 
 
 16 
makers usually become concerned in the presence of large current account deficits, which are so 
often associated with currency crises, it is not surprising that that they are also concerned with 
declining saving rates, 
This basic identity implies that in an open economy, with capital perfectly mobile across 
borders, saving and investment need not be correlated.  The early results of Feldstein and 
Horioka (1980) revealed a puzzlingly high degree of correlation, which was interpreted as 
consistent with a low degree of international capital market integration.  While subsequent 
studies have tended to find that those correlations diminished over time, these still remain in a 
range that would suggest more impediments to the free flow of capital than is evident, judging 
from the evolution of financial markets.  This pattern of a declining correlation between saving 
and investment is discussed in some of the studies in this volume.  For instance, Lopez-Murphy, 
et. al. (1998 this volume) show that in the case of Argentina, the correlation for the full 1958 to 
1995 period is 0.75, but becomes nil during the 1990s.  A more recent explanation for high 
saving-investment correlations is that due, possibly, to liquidity constraints, the bulk of 
investment is financed through the retained earning of firms, an issue that is also investigated in 
several of the studies in this volume. 
Public and private saving 
National saving can also be decomposed into its private  (Sp) and public (Sg) 
components. This breakdown will be particularly useful in explaining to what extent the 
observed stagnation of saving rates in so many countries in Latin America are due to lax fiscal 
CA. + I = Sn  
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policies or to behavior of the private sector.  For the countries in East Asia, public sector saving 
comprises nearly 25 to 40 percent of aggregate saving, implying that some portion of the rapid 
growth in that region is attributable to thrifty government spending habits.17  Hence, 
Thus, at least in the East Asian context, where public and private saving were both trending 
upward over an extended period, there is little evidence of a complete private sector offset to 
changes in public saving, as would be the case under “Ricardian equivalence.” As a result, there 
is scope for governments to boost national saving via increases in public saving. The issue of  
Ricardian equivalence amassed from the case studies will be taken up in the next subsection.   
The study on Uruguay (see Noya, Lorenzo, and Grau-Peréz, 1998 this volume) also carefully 
examines the determinants of public saving; their results provide fresh evidence of an 
electoral/political cycle, consistent with the findings for many OECD countries.18 
Capital inflows and domestic saving 
                                                 
17 See Edwards (1995). 
18 See Mishra (1997), for recent evidence on this issue. 
.S+S=S gpn
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For very low income countries, foreign aid can be a substantial portion of national 
saving, while for many of the middle income countries in Latin America highly cyclical private 
capital flows can be an uncertain source of financing consumption, investment, and growth.19  
Much of the empirical evidence suggests that there is partial offset between domestic and 
foreign saving 20  The combination of evidence on “crowding out” between capital inflows and 
domestic saving and the volatile and uncertain nature of capital inflows--not to mention their 
propensity to sudden reversals--has made policy makers weary about the attractiveness of capital 
inflows, particularly those with a short maturity.  Not surprisingly, two of the countries studied 
in the following chapters, Chile and Colombia, have introduced measures to discourage capital 
inflows and reduce foreign saving. 
Furthermore, the composition of foreign saving may also influence whether it is 
consumed, invested or saved.  For instance, Boone (1994), assessing the impact of official 
foreign aid in a large sample of developing countries, concludes that nearly all official aid is 
consumed and, hence, does little to promote growth.21  The composition also matters as regards 
the stability of foreign saving, with foreign direct investment generally thought to be a more 
stable source of external saving than short-term and portfolio capital.22  Hence, it is also useful to 
decompose national saving into its domestic ( Sd) and external components (Se), 
                                                 
19 For instance, an extreme example is Mozambique, where foreign aid amounted to 76 percent of GDP in 
1989. 
20 For a comparison of the cyclical relationship between domestic and foreign saving rates in Asia and 
Latin America, see Reinhart and Talvi (1997). 
21 See also, Obstfeld (1995). 
22 See Kaminsky and Reinhart (1998) for an Asia/Latin America study of this issue as it relates to financial 
crises. 
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Firms and households 
Lastly, we decompose private saving into the saving of firms (Sf) and that of households 
(Sh), viz: 
In the past, several studies have concluded that firm and household saving are substitutes, though 
the degree of substitution is not one for one and varies considerably across countries.23  
 Discerning among the saving patterns of the firms and households can be a valuable 
ingredient in designing policies, such as tax and pension reform, which directly or indirectly aim 
to influence saving.  For instance, following their analysis of dissaggregated private saving data, 
the study on Chile (see Agosin, Crespi, and Letelier, 1998 this volume) reaches the provocative 
conclusion that pension reform does little to explain Chile’s dramatic rise in private saving.  
They show that the steep increase in saving rates is due to firms and that, indeed, a decline in 
voluntary household saving was posted after the pension reform. 
 
I.3.2.  Public and private saving: evidence on Ricardian equivalence 
Fiscal policy plays a central role in macroeconomic management, particularly in 
developing countries, where access to international capital markets is costly and frequently 
erratic.  As the recent crises in Asia highlight, countries often increase public sector saving on 
short notice, so as to restore confidence and calm financial markets.  In the context of inflation 
                                                 
23 See, for instance, Denison (1958), Scadding (1974), and Aghevli et.al.  (1990). 
.S+S=S edn
.S+S=S hfp
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stabilization plans, whether the plans use the exchange rate or a monetary aggregate as the 
nominal anchor, fiscal adjustment is required, to allow the central bank to pursue its goal of price 
stability.  However, under certain assumptions about the completeness of financial markets and 
consumers’ horizons, theoretical models admit the possibility that any effort by governments to 
increase public saving--presumably with the goal of increasing domestic saving--will only 
induce offsetting changes in private saving.  
The conditions for Ricardian equivalence, however, are quite stringent.  It requires 
households to have perfect access to capital markets, leaving no role for liquidity constraints, it 
assumes households have an infinite planning horizon and common discount rates for the public 
and private sectors.  Furthermore, it requires that future income, tax, and public expenditure 
flows are known with certainty and taxes are nondistortionary.  Notwithstanding the low 
likelihood that all these conditions are simultaneously met, the empirical literature on the 
determinants of saving has devoted considerable efforts to assess the degree of offset, or 
substitutability, between private and public saving. 
Typically, tests for Ricardian equivalence have taken three forms.  First, studies that have 
estimated reduced form saving equations have included the public saving rate, sg as a regressor 
in explaining the private saving rate, sp,testing whether the coefficient on public sector saving is 
significantly different from minus one.  Namely, 
where z is a vector that controls for all the other determinants of private saving.  Second, it is 
εγβ tttt  + sg+ z = sp  
1.0- =   :Ho γ  
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possible to use a vector autoregressive (VAR) framework to test for Ricardian equivalence. This 
test, which is described in Appendix II, is in the spirit of Seater and Mariano (1985), who 
following Barro (1974), proposed that under Ricardian equivalence all that matters for the 
household planning problem is government consumption, as households are indifferent whether 
its financing is through taxes or debt accumulation.24   Lastly, it is possible to say something 
about whether Ricardian equivalence holds or not via an indirect route, by either testing for the 
presence of liquidity constraints, infinite horizons, or both.25 
Nine of the studies in this volume investigated empirically the issue of Ricardian 
equivalence, with the overwhelming conclusion it does not hold (Table I.9).  Either public sector 
saving is not statistically significant in explaining private saving, it has the wrong sign (Japelli 
and Pagano, 1998), or for the most part (where the coefficient has the anticipated negative sign), 
estimates of the degree of offset between public and private saving rates range from around -0.70 
to about -0.40 and are significantly different from -1.0.  Indeed, most of the results presented in 
these studies are broadly in line with those obtained in recent exhaustive cross-country studies, 
which have found a relatively low degree of offset between public and private saving relative to 
the predictions of Ricardian equivalence.  For instance, the results shown in Table 2.1 imply a 
somewhat higher degree of offset than was suggested by Loayza, Schmitt-Hebbel and Servén 
(1998), who find that the coefficient on public saving lies in the -0.30 to -0.20 range.  However, 
they are in the -0.673 to -0.416 range estimated by Edwards (1995), who also rejected Ricardian 
                                                 
24 Of course, this assumes taxes are lump sum.  If taxes are distortionary, this test would be biased against 
rejecting the null hypothesis of Ricardian equivalence. 
25 See, for instance, Haque and Montiel (1989). 
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equivalence for his sample. 
However, this evidence must be interpreted with care, as point estimates of the offset 
coefficient for Latin America may be subject to bias.  Specifically, Gavin and Perotti (1998) note 
that, unlike industrial countries, for most of Latin America access to capital markets is sporadic.  
During “bad times” private borrowing constraints will limit the private sector’s ability to offset 
changes in public saving, while the relaxation of these constraints during “good times” gives the 
private sector a greater ability to internalize the actions of the government.  Their empirical 
estimates suggest that asymmetries are significant, with the estimated offset coefficient in the 
0.70-0.75 range in the good times and roughly half that magnitude in the bad times.  
Nonetheless, their evidence, as the studies in this volume, rejects Ricardian equivalence. 
 
 I.3.3. Liquidity constraints, credit channels, financial liberalization, and consumption booms 
While there may be more than one reason for the rejection of Ricardian equivalence, one 
plausible explanation for its empirical failure is that not all households have access to credit 
markets, and hence, some households have no ability to smooth consumption over time.  Thus, 
for the liquidity constrained households, consumption decisions are entirely determined by 
current income.  On theoretical grounds, it has been shown that a relaxation of liquidity 
constraints will be associated with a consumption boom and a decline in aggregate saving.  
Furthermore, the more binding the initial constraints, the greater the consumption boom that can 
be expected.26 
                                                 
26 See Obstfeld (1995) for theoretical discussion and simulations of such exercises.  See Copelman (1994) 
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for an empirical investigation of the Campbell and Mankiw (1989) model to explain consumption booms during 
several inflation stabilization plans in Latin America. 
 
 24 
Many countries in Latin America and elsewhere have undergone or are anticipating 
substantive financial sector reforms that end a regime of financial repression, where credit was 
directed and interest rates on loans and deposits were set by decree.  Many of the past 
liberalization episodes unleashed a period of rapid growth in bank lending, asset price booms, 
and increases in consumption that often coincided with a decline in private saving rates.  Many 
of those episodes also ended in a full-fledged financial crisis.27  Hence, no analysis of saving is 
complete without an assessment of the pervasiveness of liquidity constraints.  Gauging the 
prevalence of constraints is important to both understand to what extent these may account for a 
higher level saving than would otherwise prevail and to assess what could happen to saving if the 
constraints were relaxed, say via renewed access to international capital markets, financial 
liberalization, or both mechanisms.   
The tests for the presence of liquidity constraints have often been linked to a credit 
channel in explaining the behavior of consumption/saving.  Studies that have focussed on 
reduced-form saving equations have tested for liquidity constraints by introducing credit (either 
its growth rate or as a ratio to GDP) as a regressor.  The premise is that greater access to credit 
reduces saving.  Hence, the anticipated coefficient on the credit variable is negative.  A more 
explicit test for the importance of liquidity constraints was proposed by Campbell and Mankiw 
(1989). They postulated that there are two types of households in the economy: A share of 
households, λ, are liquidity constrained and their consumption is entirely determined by the 
evolution of current income, while the remaining households, (1-λ), have free access to capital 
markets and can smooth their consumption intertemporally.  As a result,: 
                                                 
27 See Kaminsky and Reinhart (1996) for a chronology and stylized facts surrounding these episodes. 
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where aggregate consumption, ct, is the weighted sum of the unconstrained and constrained 
households, denoted by superscripts u and c, respectively.  Most often, equation (7) has been 
estimated substituting into c ut the simplest form of utility function with one good and no 
monetary considerations.28  Further simplifying assumptions have allowed for linearization of 
the Euler condition that determines the dynamics of consumption of the nonconstrained 
households.  If the real interest rate is assumed constant then the growth of aggregate 
consumption is given by, 
 
where embedded in θ is an estimate of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution (IES). 
Most of the studies in this volume (see Table I.10) addressed this issue through direct 
estimation or, indirectly by discussing the stylized evidence and reviewing the existing literature. 
 With the exception of Peru (see Gonzales, Lévano, and Llontop, 1998 this volume), who find no 
evidence of an important credit channel in the macro data, the bulk of the studies (using macro 
and/or micro data) suggest that liquidity constraints are prevalent.29  Two of the studies, Uruguay 
and Venezuela, present estimates of λ in the 0.36 to 0.53 range.  These estimates are line with 
those obtained in other countries with a similar level of development.30  Interestingly, 
                                                 
28 See Reinhart and Talvi (1997) for a survey of this literature for developing countries. 
29 These results contrast those reported for Peru in Haque and Montiel (1989), who estimate a statistically 
significant λ=0.25. 
30 See Vaidyanathan (1993) for the link between liquidity constraints and development. 
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introducing an interaction term between income and credit growth in equation (8) (see Noya, 
Lorenzo, Grau-Pérez, 1998 this volume) reduces λ. 
The discussion in the papers on Colombia, Italy, Mexico, the United Kingdom, and 
Uruguay also provide some support for the view that relaxation of liquidity constraints following 
financial liberalization played a substantive role in explaining the observed decline in private 
saving rates in those countries.  In a similar vein, the study on Argentina suggests that regaining 
access to international capital markets following the implementation of the Convertibility plan 
played a key role in decoupling aggregate saving and investment.  Indeed, a recent study that 
exploits new panel cross-country data for developing and OECD countries finds that in most 
specifications, the credit variable had the anticipated negative sign in the saving equation.31 
                                                 
31 See Loyaza, Schmitt-Hebbel, and Servén (1998) and Edwards (1995). 
The evidence from most of the studies that use micro data on saving by firms (Chile,  
Colombia) and households (Mexico) seem to corroborate the results from the macro data both in 
terms of  the existence of binding liquidity constraints.  These studies also allocate a key role to 
the relaxation of these constraints in explaining the decline in the 1990s in private saving rates in 
Colombia and Mexico following financial liberalization.  Furthermore, Calderón-Madrid (1998 
this volume) finds evidence that the boom in real estate prices that accompanied financial 
liberalization in Mexico further contributed to the decline in saving by households.  His results 
suggest that households who owned property, and could use such property as collateral to secure 
loans, saved less.  For Peru  (see Gonzales, Lévano, and Llontop, 1998 this volume), the results 
from the micro data are somewhat more conflicting.  The authors find no evidence of high 
saving/investment correlations for firms, suggesting liquidity constraints were not quantitatively 
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important, yet their household data reveal that access to credit in post-1991 played an important 
role in explaining the decline in household saving.  The evidence from Agosin, Crespi, and 
Letelier’s (1998 this volume) analysis of firm’s saving behavior in Chile provide support for the 
argument put forth in Morande (1996), that the steep rise in firm’s saving during most of the 
1980s had much to do with the rising liquidity constraints they faced, as bank credit dried up in 
the wake of the severe crisis that shook Chile’s financial sector. 
The studies that analyzed the recent consumption booms in Argentina and Uruguay 
following their exchange-rate based (ERBS) inflation stabilization plans in the early 1990s also 
provide interesting insights as to why private saving rates declined (Table I.11).  While there is a 
substantial theoretical literature on the potential sources of these booms, and a more limited 
empirical one, the study by López-Murphy, Navajas, Urbiztondo, Moskovitz (1998) on 
Argentina represents one of the very first efforts to explain what drives durable goods 
consumption during these boom periods.32  Indeed, the surge in durable goods consumption 
(these are usually imports) is at the center stage of the consumption booms that have 
characterized so many of the recent and past inflation stabilization plans.  Unfortunately, lack of 
data availability on durable goods consumption has, to date, limited researchers’ ability to 
analyze this issue formally.   
                                                 
32 See Reinhart and Végh (1995). 
The study of Argentina suggests that revisions to expectations about the path of future 
income played a key role in explaining the boom.  Yet, the results also suggest that the evolution 
of interest rates also played an important role; this result is subject to more than one 
interpretation.  There is the intertemporal story, as pioneered by Calvo (1986), that suggests that 
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if the interest rate decline is perceived to be temporary, people will consume today when the 
effective price of consumption is relatively low to its expected future level.  However, the results 
are also consistent with other interpretations.  Recalling that interest rates affect the relative price 
of the flow of durable goods services (see Ogaki and Reinhart, 1998), lower interest rates will 
also induce an intratemporal substitution toward relatively cheaper durable goods.  Furthermore, 
the lower interest rates could be a function of a declining country risk premia, more favorable 
access to international capital markets, and hence, a relaxation of liquidity constraints.  Indeed, 
the authors present such evidence when analyzing the saving-investment link.   
Durable goods are also relatively credit intensive vìs-a-vìs services and nondurables.   
Hence, the results for Uruguay (Noya, Lorenzo, Grau-Pérez, 1998 this volume), which use total 
consumption and includes durable goods, suggest that easier availability of credit may have 
fueled the boom in consumption and the decline in the saving rate. 
In sum, the heterogenous evidence presented in these studies suggests that agents in most 
countries are affected in varying degrees by liquidity constraints and that a relaxation of these 
constraints may partially account for a decline in the saving rate.  Whether the decline in saving 
is secular or transitory remains to be seem and merits further study. 
 
I.3.4.  Do Capital Inflows Crowd Out Domestic Saving? 
There are many parallels between analyzing the links between saving and liquidity 
constraints and assessing the relationship between domestic and foreign saving.  In industrial 
countries, access to international capital markets is continuous and, by and large, taken for 
granted.  Yet, for most developing countries--including those such as Korea, which had achieved 
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near-industrialized status--access to international capital is limited in scope, given that it is 
costly, and subject to periodic collapses.  In other words, examining the link between domestic 
and foreign saving involves looking at liquidity constraints (and the relaxation of these) at the 
country level rather than at the level of the household or the firm. 
Hence, like a relaxation in domestic liquidity constraints, greater access to foreign saving 
(i.e., capital inflows) may lead to a decline in domestic saving.  This proposition is well justified 
on theoretical grounds (see Reinhart and Talvi, 1997) and has been documented in the empirical 
literature with mixed results.  Capital inflows may finance consumption booms.  This can occur 
through a variety of channels, but one channel, which is particularly relevant to the Asian and 
Latin American experience of the 1990s, has to do with the role played by banks.  During 
periods in which international interest rates are markedly below domestic interest rates, it is very 
profitable for banks to borrow offshore (a capital inflow) and lend domestically at the higher 
interest rates.  The greater availability of credit for both households and firms provides an 
opportunity to consume (and/or invest) beyond the confines of current income. Thus, the decline 
in private saving. 
As with testing for Ricardian equivalence in the context of a reduced-form saving 
equation framework, most of the studies that have examined the link between domestic and 
foreign saving have done so by including foreign saving (or, else, the current account) as an 
explanatory variable for private saving or domestic saving.  However, unlike Ricardian 
equivalence, the null hypothesis tested is whether the coefficient on foreign saving is 
significantly different from zero or not.  Because, the relationship between domestic and foreign 
saving that is suggested by theoretical explanations is likely to be cyclical, while secular factors 
 
 30 
are more closely linked to income trends and demographics, another approach has focussed on 
correlations among the cyclical components of domestic and foreign saving. 
In four of the five studies in this volume that examined this issue closely (the exception is 
El Salvador, see Table I.12), the conclusion that emerges is that foreign saving crowds out, albeit 
not perfectly (the exception is Chile) domestic saving.33  The bulk of the coefficients on foreign 
saving are clustered in the -0.40 to -0.30 range.  In the case of El Salvador, the sign of the 
coefficient on foreign saving is not stable.  However, this result may possibly be accounted for 
by the fact that for El Salvador an important component of “capital inflows” are workers’ 
remittances, which are included as an additional explanatory variable in the system.34  Indeed, 
worker’s remittances are significant and have the anticipated negative sign in all the regressions. 
 Focussing on the cyclical components of domestic and foreign saving, Reinhart and Talvi 
(1997) also conclude that the bulk of the evidence for both Asia and Latin America is that 
domestic and external saving negatively rather than positively related.  Other things equal, the 
weight of this empirical evidence would suggest that a relaxation of international “liquidity 
constraints,” via a rise in capital inflows, can be expected to reduce domestic saving, although 
usually the decline is not proportional. 
 
I.3.5.  Growth and Saving: What Comes First? 
                                                 
33 Agosin, Crespi, an Letelier (1998 this volume) find that for Chile they cannot reject the null hypothesis 
that the offset is complete, that is, the coefficient on foreign saving is not significantly different from -1.0. 
34 Worker’s remittances show up in the current account, not the capital account.  Yet these are most often 
viewed as a capital inflow/outflow (see Rivera Campos, 1998). 
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An earlier literature on the links between saving and growth stressed the need for 
countries to boost their saving rates.  Paradoxically, in light of the preceding discussion, it was 
thought that financial deregulation could accomplish this task.  By allowing real interest rates to 
rise and, in many cases, become positive for the first time, financial deregulation would bolster 
saving.  In turn, higher saving rates would finance higher levels of investment and fuel economic 
growth.35  While financial deregulation does, more often than not, result in higher real interest 
rates, it has failed to produce the anticipated positive effects on saving.36  Over and beyond the 
credit channel discussed in the preceding subsections, there may be important reasons why the 
link between saving and real rates of return may be weak, particularly for low-income 
countries.37    Furthermore, even if saving increases in response to the higher real interest rates, 
recent studies have even questioned that the chain of causation runs from saving to growth.  The 
evidence presented in Carroll and Weil (1993) suggests that growth drives saving rates--and not 
the other way around.  
From a policy standpoint, taking these results at face value implies that policymakers 
need not be concerned with tax incentives and other policies geared toward stimulating domestic 
saving.  Instead, their focus should be on structural reforms that increase efficiency and 
macroeconomic stabilization.  This is, of course, a simplistic argument.  Even in the absence of a 
saving/growth causal chain, policymakers may wish to pursue higher levels of saving.  For 
instance, a marked decline in private saving, such as those observed in Argentina, Colombia, and 
                                                 
35 See, for instance, McKinnon (1973). 
36 See Galbis (1993) on the evolution of interest rates during financial liberalization. 
37 For instance, Ogaki, Ostry, and Reinhart, (1996) argue that the sensitivity of saving to real interest rates 
depends on a country’s level of wealth.  The poorer the country and the closer it is to only being able to support a 
subsistence level of consumption, the less saving will respond to changes in interest rates. 
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Mexico in the 1990s, may precipitate an undesired deterioration in the current account, that 
could undermine credibility and precipitate a currency crisis.  Furthermore, while the existing 
empirical literature has had relatively little to say about this, domestic saving is likely to be a less 
volatile source of funds than fickle foreign saving. 
Following Carroll and Weil (1993), the most common approach to assess what comes 
first, when it comes to saving-growth causality, is to rely on straightforward Granger-causality 
tests.38  Typically, five-year to ten-year averages for saving and growth are used and, hence, a 
single lag is sufficient to address the temporal precedence, or causality, issue. 
The case studies that examined this issue, unlike the more clearcut findings of the 
absence of Ricardian equivalence, the importance of liquidity constraints, and the substitutability 
between domestic and foreign saving, no clear consensus emerges.  Table I.13 highlights the 
diversity of the findings.  For Chile and Venezuela, the results appear to point in the causal 
direction from growth to saving (and investment).  For Colombia, the results are sensitive to how 
the “long-run” values of output and saving are measured.  For one measure, there is no apparent 
link between saving and growth, while for another there is mutual causation.  The evidence 
presented in Japelli and Pagano (1998 this volume) shows a strong positive influence from 
growth to saving; but the opposite chain of causation is not empirically investigated.  For Spain, 
the evidence presented in Boldrin and Martin (1998 this volume) suggests that contemporaneous 
growth/saving correlations are high, but no causal link is evident. 
In sum, the collective evidence from the studies in this volume do not provide conclusive 
support (or disprove for that matter) the results presented in Carroll and Weil (1993), in which, 
                                                 
38 See Appendix II. 
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growth causes saving.  Given the richness of the policy implications as to how this issue is 
settled, perhaps the only clear conclusion derived from these studies is that the links between 
long-term growth and saving merit further scrutiny in Latin America.  
 
I.3.6. The Life-Cycle Hypothesis: macro and micro evidence 
The LCH is derived from the aggregation of finite-lived overlapping generations and 
introduces age-related consumer heterogeneity.  Consumption in any period is a function of both 
wealth and disposable income, where the marginal propensities to consume from either are 
dependent on factors such as age, life expectancy, and working years.  The LCH posits that 
individuals will dissave when thay are young, have positive saving during their working years, 
and run down their savings in retirement.  Hence, saving follows a hump-shaped pattern for each 
consumer. 
Variables associated with the LCH have, most often, found strong empirical support in 
the cross-country macroeconomic data.  Most often, studies that estimate reduced form saving 
equations using panel or cross-sectional data find that the age dependency ratio is significantly 
and negatively linked to saving.  While the values of the estimated coefficients are sensitive to 
the set of regressors used, the sample countries,  and how the dependency ratio was measured, 
the results appears to be robust across a broad array of specifications and data sets.39  As the 
LCH would predict, the higher the share of the very young and the very old (who dissave) in the 
population--the lower the saving rate.  As shown in Table I.14, two of the studies that examined 
                                                 
39 Other demographic variables frequently included in the regression analysis are population growth rates 
and average retirement ages. 
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this issue empirically (Colombia and Peru) do, indeed, present similar evidence.   
Unlike the issue of liquidity constraints, where the results from the study of the micro and 
macro data converged, the evidence on the LCH is less conclusive.  As noted, there is some 
support for the LCH at the macro level.  In the case of Peru, the pattern of household saving 
across age groups in cross-sectional micro data appeared to be broadly consistent with the hump-
shaped pattern predicted by LCH. Yet, two of the studies that analyzed micro household data 
find little support for LCH predictions.  In the case of Mexico, the number of children aged 12 or 
less per households has a positive and significant coefficient in the saving equations, while 
households headed by someone aged 65 or more (the oldest group) saved more, although its 
statistical significance depended on the year examined.  In a similar vein, Japelli and Pagano 
(1998) have little success in explaining Italy’s declining saving rate on the basis of the life cycle 
model’s predictions.  During a period of slowing economic growth, the LCH would predict that 
saving would fall, as the incomes of the highest saving age group--those middle-aged and 
actively employed--would be proportionately hit the hardest.  Hence, a priori one should expect 
to find in the micro data that the decline in saving rates is largely confined to this working age 
cohort.  The data presented in Japelli and Pagano (1998 this volume) instead reveal declines in 
the saving rates of all age groups.  Perhaps, the lack of conclusive evidence on the causality from 
growth to saving in these studies reflects an ambiguity in its underpinnings in the LCH. 
 
  I.3.7. Other determinants of saving 
In this subsection, we focus on two additional variables that in both theory and existing 
evidence emerge as potential determinants of private saving.  The first variable, income 
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distribution, has usually been coupled with household saving, while the terms-of-trade may both 
affect the household and the firm. 
Income distribution 
The bulk of the theoretical literature on household saving has suggested that, other things 
equal, a more skewed income distribution would produce a higher level of aggregate saving.  
The argument rests on differential propensities to consume out of current income, with the rich 
consuming a proportionally lower share of their income.  However, a recent strand of the 
political economy literature has suggested that there is a positive link between political 
instability and income inequality.40  The argument runs as follows: Political instability increases 
uncertainty; uncertainty adversely affects investment, and; lower investment means lower 
growth.  Taking this causal chain a step further, if, indeed, growth causes saving as Carol and 
Weil (1993) suggest, then countries with more income inequality and lower growth would also 
be expected to have lower saving rates.  Hence, on theoretical grounds, the sign of the coefficient 
on income inequality is ambiguous.  Previous, empirical studies (see Plies and Reinhart, 1998, 
for a recent survey) have found scattered evidence in favor of both positive and negative links.  
A recent study by Schmidt-Hebbel and Servén (1996), using a comprehensive panel cross-
country data set on income distribution, found no significant link.  This lack of significance was 
both robust to the specification of saving used as well as to the choice of sample countries.  
Table I.15 summarizes the results of the studies in this volume that examined this issue.  The 
studies for Spain and Venezuela in this volume examined this issue using macro data; in neither 
case was the proxy for income distribution significant. 
                                                 
40 See, for instance, Alessina and Rodrik (1994) and Persson and Tabellini (1994). 
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On the basis of the household data, the Mexican study offers some provocative results.  
While the issue of income distribution is not explicitly addressed,  Calderón-Madrid (1998 this 
volume) links household saving to educational attainment, specifically, years of education.  
Presumably education and income levels are positively related, indeed the household survey data 
from Peru illustrates this positive correlation.  Yet, Calderón-Madrid finds that more educated 
households save less.  The interpretation given in that paper is that these households have access 
to credit, while less educated households heads do not. 
The terms of trade 
As with income distribution, the predicted theoretical sign of the relationship between the 
terms of trade and saving is ambiguous.  When a country experiences an adverse temporary 
terms of trade shock, (a decline in the relative price of its exports), this temporary decline in 
current income should lead to dissaving, based on consumption smoothing considerations--this is 
the basis of the Harberger-Laursen-Metzler (HLM) effect and it follows from the permanent 
income hypothesis (PIH).  The PIH suggests that there is a difference between the short-run and 
long-run marginal propensity to consume, where the difference depends on the perceived 
permanence of the change in income.  If the decline in income is seen as permanent, abstracting 
from habit persistence, consumption would be reduced accordingly; if the shock is temporary, 
consumption does not adjust and saving declines.  
However, this is only part of story.  Following the shock, imports are now expensive 
relative to other goods in the basket.  This relative price shift can be expected to lead individuals 
to substitute away from the imported good and consume less of it--this is known as the 
consumption-tilting effect.  Hence, consumption smoothing considerations suggests a positive 
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relationship between the terms of trade and saving and consumption-tilting a negative one.   
Presumably, the issue can be settled empirically.  Of the four case studies in the 
following chapters that examine this issue, all find a positive and  influence of the terms of trade 
on saving, consistent with the HLM hypothesis.  In two cases, El Salvador and Peru, the terms of 
trade are part of the cointegrating vector, suggesting these influence the long run level of saving, 
if not necessarily its short-run dynamics.  In the case of Venezuela, estimates of an Euler 
equation derived from a model that allows for consumption of traded and nontraded goods, as in 
Ostry and Reinhart (1992), are used to simulate the effects on saving from a terms of trade 
shock; these exercises suggest saving in Venezuela is highly sensitive to the terms-of-trade.  
Lastly, while for the case of Argentina, the correlation between saving and the terms of trade is 
positive, it is close to zero and not likely to be statistically significant. 
Perhaps, it is not surprising to find that of the four case studies that examined the 
saving/terms-of-trade link, the three that find a strong systematic and positive relationship are 
the three countries that have the least diversified export structure and their export revenues are 
heavily dependent on one or a handful of primary commodities.  In the case of El Salvador, it is 
coffee, in Peru minerals and ores, and in Venezuela oil. 
 
 I.4 Some final thoughts 
As to the stylized facts, the preceding discussion has suggested that there are important 
common threads in saving rates across Latin America, particularly as to the cyclical behavior of 
saving.  In addition, domestic saving rates have, more often than not, remained relatively flat 
over the past twenty five years.  No doubt, the sharp slowdown in economic growth during the 
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1980s that hit most of the region has much to say about the prevalence of stagnant saving rates.  
Over and beyond that, it would appear that regional explanations may not be adequate.  As we 
have shown, there is considerable cross-country variation in the evolution through time of 
public, firm, and household saving that are masked in the broader aggregates.   
Many of the previous studies that have analyzed saving behavior in Latin America and 
elsewhere have relied on the highly aggregated data and have pooled countries for the purpose of 
conducting cross-country and panel analysis.  This broad-brush approach has proven extremely 
useful for pinning down some of the stylized evidence on the determinants of saving. Yet, from 
the vantage point of designing policies that seek to directly or indirectly influence the level of 
saving and recalling the heterogeneity of the country experiences in our sample, it seems 
inappropriate to suggest a “regional” policy prescription.  This highly varied experience makes 
it all the more necessary to gain a deeper understanding of the individual country characteristics 
and circumstances.   
The case studies contained in this volume represent a step in this direction.  From a broad 
pool of time series on the saving patterns of households, firms, government, and the external 
sector as well as from micro data for individual household and firms, these studies allow for a 
richer understanding of what has driven saving rates in these countries.  In addition, as discussed 
in the following chapters, these case studies have much to contribute to a wide range of topics 
that are directly linked to economic policy. The most conclusive evidence from their collected 
results can be summarized as follows: 
First, despite of the heterogeneity of approaches and case studies, the overwhelming 
empirical evidence seems to suggest that, while there is some degree of offset between public 
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and private saving, households do not fully internalize the consumption decisions of the public 
sector.  Indeed, in most instances the estimated degree of offset is quite low.  This implies that 
governments can have an active role in influencing the level of domestic saving. 
Second, possibly explaining the absence of Ricardian equivalence, liquidity constraints 
appear to be quantitatively important.  The bulk of the evidence from both macro and micro data 
on firms and households appear to suggest that: i) some portion of the population has no access 
to credit markets and consumption decisions are ruled by current income; ii) Credit aggregates 
(in the macro data) or access to credit (in the micro data) convey much information about the 
prevalence of constraints and can explain much of the behavior in saving rates during periods in 
which those constraints changed markedly--increases in firms’ saving rates in Chile have been 
linked to the tightening of liquidity constraints during the banking crisis years and declines in 
saving rates in Argentina, Colombia, Italy, Mexico, Peru (for households), the United Kingdom, 
and Uruguay have been associated with their relaxation.  In this regard, a fruitful line of enquiry 
would explore the role of monetary and financial sector policies in influencing aggregate saving. 
Third, the study on Argentina had much to say about what drives consumption boom 
and, particularly, booms that are driven by a surge in household expenditure in durable goods.  
Broader cross-country studies in this area would enrich our understanding of 
consumption/saving cycles.  For indeed, household decisions on whether to act now or postpone 
durable goods purchases have much to say about the cycles in consumption/saving. 
Fourth, the bulk of the evidence in these studies suggests that foreign saving is more 
likely to displace domestic saving than to complement it--although in most cases the extent of 
offset is partial.  Given that potentially (largely based on descriptive analysis) foreign saving is 
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more volatile than its domestic counterpart, as to policy these results raise call into question the 
desirability of having “too much” foreign saving, or capital inflows.  It calls for a reassessment 
of the desirability (if not the feasibility and usefulness) of capital controls.  It  again raises the  
issue of liquidity constraints, whether these come from the domestic financial sector or are 
imposed from abroad by fickle capital markets. 
Fifth, the ambiguity (although many of the results suggest a growth-saving causal link) 
as to what comes first--saving or growth, the results summarized here highlight the need for 
further study in this area.  Are vast regional differences between Asia (notwithstanding its recent 
woes) and Latin America as regards saving rates partly explained by growth in the former in the 
1980s and stagnation in the latter?  These issues has not been conclusively settled and calls for 
greater scrutiny. 
Sixth, the evidence presented here provides, at best, mixed support for the LCH and no 
support to suggest that income distribution has anything to add to our understanding of what 
drives saving rates.  Certainly, if a skewed income distribution provided the boost to private 
saving that consumer theory tells us it should, then Latin America should have much higher 
saving rates than Asia!  In a group of Latin American countries the ratio of income in the top 
quintile to that in the bottom quintile is 16, or about twice that of Asia.41 
Lastly, it would appear that whether terms of trade shocks have a significant or minimal 
impact on how much is saved may depend importantly on the concentration of, and primary 
commodity content of, exports.  Without overemphasizing this result, it would appear that the 
countries with the least diversified export structure and greatest primary commodity exposure are 
                                                 
41 See Plies and Reinhart (1998). 
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the most affected (in terms of the impact on saving) by terms of trade developments.42 
                                                 
42 See also Elbadawi and Mwega (1998) for a comparison of African countries, which are 
highly weighed toward primary commodity exports, to other developing countries. 
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 Appendix I.  Macroeconomic Time Series Used 
 
 
Country 
 
National 
Saving 
 
Domestic 
Saving 
 
Public 
Saving 
 
Private 
Saving 
 
Household 
Saving 
 
Firms’ 
Saving 
 
Foreign 
Saving 
 
Argentina 
 
1958-1995 
 
1958-1995 
 
1970-1995 
 
1970-1995 
 
N.A. 
 
N.A. 
 
1958-1995 
 
Chile 
 
1975-1994 
 
N.A. 
 
1975-1994 
 
1975-1994 
 
1975-1994 
 
1975-1994 
 
N.A. 
 
Colombia
1 
 
1958-1994 
 
1958-1994 
 
1958-1994 
 
1958-1994 
 
1970-1994 
 
1970-1994 
 
1958-1994 
 
El 
Salvador 
 
1958-1993 
 
1958-1995 
 
1958-1995 
 
1958-1995 
 
N.A. 
 
N.A. 
 
1958-1995  
 
Mexico 
 
1965-1995 
 
1965-1995 
 
1965-1995 
 
1965-1995 
 
1987-1994 
 
1987-1994 
 
1965-1995 
 
Peru 
 
1958-1994 
 
1958-1994 
 
1958-1994 
 
1958-1994 
 
1979-1994 
 
1979-1994 
 
1958-1994 
 
Uruguay 
 
N.A. 
 
1980-1994 
 
1980-1994 
 
1980-1994 
 
N.A. 
 
N.A. 
 
N.A. 
 
Venezuel
a 
 
1968-1994 
 
1968-1994 
 
1968-1994 
 
1968-1994 
 
N.A. 
 
N.A. 
 
1968-1994 
 
Note: Several of the papers also have extensive cross-sectional data on households and firms.  See Chapter 2 and 
original papers. 
1 The Cardenas and Escobar study (this volume) actually uses longer time series spanning 1925 to 1994. 
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 Appendix II.  Methodological Notes 
 
AII.1. Testing for Ricardian Equicalence 
 
 The variables in the system would be private consumption (c), income (y), government 
consumption (g), taxes (t), the change in public sector debt (ΔD), and any other determinant of 
consumption or saving that needs to be controlled for (z).  The VAR could be estimated in levels, 
if the variables are stationary, or in an error correction (ECVAR) form that is associated with 
Johanssen (1988), if they are nonstationary.  A representative equation in ECVAR system, say 
that of private consumption, with a single lag to model dynamics would take the form, 
The unrestricted model, as shown in equation (A.1), would be estimated and compared to 
a second model, which restricts the coefficients on taxes and the change in public debt in both 
the long-run relationship (the βs) and the dynamics (the δs) to be zero under the assumption of 
Ricardian equivalence, which is the null or maintained hypothesis.  The restricted and 
unrestricted models are compared via a χ2 test on the exclusion restrictions. 
 
AII.2 Saving-growth causality tests 
 Following Carroll and Weil (1993), the most common approach to assess what comes first, 
when it comes to saving-growth causality, is to rely on straightforward Granger-causality tests.  
in the context of a VAR framework of the following form, 
εδδδδ
δδδδδ
βββββ
t-1t9t8-1t7t6
-1t5t4-1t3t2-1t1
-1t5-1t4-1t3-1t2-1t1t
 + z + z + )D( + )D( +
 
 t + t + g + g + c +
 
 z + D + t + g + c = c
ΔΔΔΔΔΔ
ΔΔΔΔΔ
ΔΔ
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Typically, five-year to ten-year averages for saving and growth are used and, hence, a single lag 
is sufficient to address the temporal precedence, or causality, issue. 
εββ
εββ
2t-1t22-1t21t
1t-1t12-1t11t
 + y + s = y
 + y + s = s
ΔΔΔ
ΔΔΔ
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 Table I.1.  Saving Rates: Descriptive Statistics 
 
 
Statistic 
 
National 
Saving 
 
Domestic 
Saving 
 
Public 
Saving 
 
Private 
Saving 
 
Firms’ 
Saving 
 
Household 
Saving 
 
Foreign 
Saving 
 
Argentina 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Mean 
 
20.57 
 
20.17 
 
5.79 
 
15.25 
 
N.A. 
 
N.A. 
 
0.40 
 
Standard 
deviation 
 
3.12 
 
4.39 
 
4.01 
 
2.54 
 
N.A. 
 
N.A. 
 
2.23 
 
Minimum 
 
15.44 
 
11.26 
 
-0.89 
 
7.97 
 
N.A. 
 
N.A. 
 
-4.99 
 
Maximum 
 
29.79 
 
31.72 
 
14.35 
 
20.50 
 
N.A. 
 
N.A. 
 
5.58 
 
Chile 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Mean 
 
15.75 
 
N.A. 
 
4.62 
 
10.33 
 
12.96 
 
-2.46 
 
N.A. 
 
Standard 
deviation 
 
9.94 
 
N.A. 
 
3.91 
 
7.95 
 
7.12 
 
2.76 
 
N.A. 
 
Minimum 
 
2.20 
 
N.A. 
 
-2.40 
 
0.80 
 
2.60 
 
-8.10 
 
N.A. 
 
Maximum 
 
40.50 
 
N.A. 
 
12 
 
22.10 
 
23.20 
 
3.5 
 
N.A. 
 
Colombia 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Mean 
 
18.58 
 
17.63 
 
5.25 
 
13.33 
 
4.02 
 
8.01 
 
0.95 
 
Standard 
deviation 
 
2.42 
 
5.13 
 
2.36 
 
1.74 
 
1.26 
 
1.33 
 
2.9 
 
Minimum 
 
13.53 
 
7.29 
 
1.34 
 
8.52 
 
1.24 
 
5.14 
 
-6.76 
 
Maximum 
 
22.88 
 
28.57 
 
10.26 
 
15.43 
 
6.52 
 
10.37 
 
6.24 
 
El 
Salvador 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Mean 
 
12.41 
 
9.91 
 
-1.4 
 
14.04 
 
N.A. 
 
N.A. 
 
2.49 
 
Standard 
deviation 
 
4.49 
 
6.04 
 
1.87 
 
4.48 
 
N.A. 
 
N.A. 
 
2.81 
 
Minimum 
 
1.28 
 
-2.81 
 
-5.45 
 
1.61 
 
N.A. 
 
N.A. 
 
-1.32 
 
Maximum 
 
24.62 
 
25.86 
 
3.63 
 
24.2 
 
N.A. 
 
N.A. 
 
9.25 
 
Note: Totals may not add up, as the sample periods may be different.  In most cases, the breakdown of private 
consumption into its household and firm components is available for a subset of the total sample for the more recent 
period. 
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 Table I.1  Saving Rates: Descriptive Statistics (concluded) 
 
 
 
 
National 
Saving 
 
Domestic 
Saving 
 
Public 
Saving 
 
Private 
Saving 
 
Firms’ 
Saving 
 
Household 
Saving 
 
Foreign 
Saving 
 
Mexico 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Mean 
 
15.58 
 
12.86 
 
1.96 
 
13.61 
 
6.11 
 
3.32 
 
2.72 
 
Standard 
deviation 
 
5.69 
 
6.39 
 
2.82 
 
3.05 
 
1.35 
 
1.61 
 
2.82 
 
Minimum 
 
3.31 
 
-2.28 
 
-3.35 
 
6.58 
 
4.6 
 
1.3 
 
-4.69 
 
Maximum 
 
30.05 
 
26.72 
 
10.01 
 
20.05 
 
7.6 
 
6.3 
 
7.83 
 
Peru 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Mean 
 
21.47 
 
18.91 
 
-0.25 
 
19.22 
 
7.45 
 
13.67 
 
2.5 
 
Standard 
deviation 
 
3.71 
 
3.69 
 
2.31 
 
3.46 
 
3.01 
 
5.51 
 
3.05 
 
Minimum 
 
15.17 
 
10.36 
 
-6.99 
 
12.71 
 
2.27 
 
3.23 
 
-4.58 
 
Maximum 
 
31.12 
 
25.89 
 
4.87 
 
25.89 
 
12.87 
 
21.08 
 
9.16 
 
Uruguay 
 
 
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Mean 
 
N.A. 
 
14.59 
 
1.25 
 
13.33 
 
N.A. 
 
N.A. 
 
N.A. 
 
Standard 
deviation 
 
N.A. 
 
2.09 
 
3.4 
 
3.87 
 
N.A. 
 
N.A. 
 
N.A. 
 
Minimum 
 
N.A. 
 
11.3 
 
-5.5 
 
7.1 
 
N.A. 
 
N.A. 
 
N.A. 
 
Maximum 
 
N.A. 
 
17.2 
 
6.6 
 
19.5 
 
N.A. 
 
N.A. 
 
N.A. 
 
Venezuela 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Mean 
 
20.93 
 
23.25 
 
9.52 
 
11.41 
 
N.A. 
 
N.A. 
 
-2.32 
 
Standard 
deviation 
 
4.74 
 
4.54 
 
4.93 
 
3.98 
 
N.A. 
 
N.A. 
 
1.43 
 
Minimum 
 
14.23 
 
16.96 
 
1.91 
 
2.91 
 
N.A. 
 
N.A. 
 
-4.72 
 
Maximum 
 
36.76 
 
39.33 
 
20.1 
 
17.84 
 
N.A. 
 
N.A. 
 
0.02 
Note: Totals may not add up, as the sample periods may be different.  In most cases, the breakdown of private 
consumption into its household and firm components is available for a subset of the total sample for the more recent 
period. 
 
Table I.2. Trends and Cycles in Saving and its Components: Latin America 
 
 
Country/Study 
 
Sample 
Period 
 
The trend in saving and its 
components 
 
Recent Developments 
 
Argentina, 
López Murphy, 
Navajas, 
Urbiztondo, 
and Moskovitz 
(1998) 
 
1968 to 1994 
 
Private saving has been trendless, 
while public saving has been in a 
downward trend. 
 
Following the Convertibility Plan in 
early 1991 and renewed access to 
international capital markets, private 
saving rates fell sharply, recovering in 
1994.  A boom in durable goods 
expenditures by households is 
associated with the decline in saving 
rates. 
 
Chile, Agosin, 
 
1975 to 1994 
 
Sharp upward trend in private Both public and private saving have 
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Crespi, and 
Letelier (1998) 
saving, while public saving is 
flat. Saving by firms appears to 
account for the steady rise in 
private saving. 
remained close to their trends in the 
1990s. 
 
Colombia, 
Cardenas and 
Escobar (1998) 
 
1958 to 1994 
 
Private saving has been flat (as 
saving by households and firms 
have been trendless), while public 
saving showed an upward trend 
during this period. 
 
Following trade and financial 
liberalization in 1991, private saving 
(particularly that of firms) fell sharply.  
Tax increases appear to contribute to 
this decline. 
 
El Salvador, 
Rivera Campos 
(1998) 
 
1968 to 1994 
 
Slight downward trend in private 
saving; flat public saving profile. 
 
Following its collapse during the period 
of civil unrest in the early 1980s, saving 
rates have been recovering steadily in 
the 1990s. 
 
Mexico, 
Calderón-
Madrid (1998) 
 
1965 to 1995 
 
Both public and private saving 
have been trending lower 
throughout this period. 
 
Following its December 1987 inflation 
stabilization plan, private saving, 
particularly that of households, fell 
sharply below its trend, recovering only 
in 1994. 
 
Peru, Gonzales, 
Lévano, and 
Llontop (1998) 
 
1958 to 1994 
 
Private saving has shown a 
modest upward trend, while 
public saving has shown a 
tendency to decline over time.  
The rise in private saving is 
associated with a positive trend in 
saving by firms, as household 
saving has declined steadily. 
 
Following the “Fujishock” and its 
reforms, including financial 
liberalization, private saving fell sharply 
as household saving fell well below its 
trend.  Firms’ saving continued to 
increase during this period. 
 
Uruguay, Noya, 
Lorenzo, and 
Grau-Pérez 
(1998) 
 
1980 to 1994 
 
Modest downtrend in private 
saving and upward trend in public 
saving. 
 
Following its 1991 inflation stabilization 
plan, private saving dipped further, well 
below its trend.  A relaxation of liquidity 
constraints helps explain this. 
 
Venezuela, 
Zambrano, 
Riutort, Muñoz, 
and Guevara 
(1998) 
 
1968 to 1994 
 
Marked downtrend in private 
saving, public saving essentially 
flat. 
 
Prior to the 1994 banking crisis, private 
saving had fallen below its secular trend. 
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 Table I.3. Trends in Public and Private Saving 
 
 
Sector 
 
Negative trend 
 
Flat (no trend) 
 
Positive trend 
 
Public Saving 
 
3 
 
2 
 
3 
 
Private Saving 
 
4 
 
2 
 
2 
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 Table I.4. Trends and Cycles in Saving and its Components: European Case Studies 
 
 
Country 
 
Sample 
Period 
 
The trend in saving and its 
components 
 
Recent Developments 
 
Italy, Japelli 
and Pagano 
(1998) 
 
1950 to 1990 
 
Private saving has been trendless, 
although saving rates declined 
steadily in the 1980s.  
Households appear to account for 
this decline. Public saving has 
been in a downward trend. 
 
Slowing growth, financial liberalization, 
and changes to social security appears to 
be important factors explaining the 
decline in private saving. 
 
Spain, Boldrin 
and Martin 
(1998) 
 
1964 to 1995 
 
Upward trend in private saving, 
while public saving is has a sharp 
negative trend. 
 
Following important trade and financial 
liberalization measures private saving 
fell in the early 1980s and then 
recovered.  Structural changes in 
expectations about the income-
generating process appear to explain this 
shift in private saving.  The reforms did 
not appear to have a substantive effect. 
 
United 
Kingdom, Begg 
and Griffith-
Jones (1998) 
 
1963 to 1995 
 
Private saving has been flat (as 
saving by households and firms 
have been trendless), while public 
saving has shown a downward 
trend during this period. 
 
Following financial liberalization in the 
early 1980s, private saving (both 
households and firms) fell.  Saving by 
firms recovered in the 1990s.  A 
relaxation of liquidity constraints and an 
“euphoria” factor about expected path of 
income appear to explain this pattern. 
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 Table I.5 Correlation of Domestic Saving Across the Region and Factor Analysis, 1980-1993 
 
 
 
 
Argentina 
 
Chile 
 
Colombia 
 
El Salvador 
 
Mexico 
 
Peru 
 
Argentina 
 
1.00 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chile 
 
-0.12 
 
1.00 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Colombia 
 
-0.60 
 
0.54 
 
1.00 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
El Salvador 
 
0.49 
 
-0.67 
 
-0.67 
 
1.00 
 
 
 
 
 
Mexico 
 
0.52 
 
-0.47 
 
-0.47 
 
0.61 
 
1.00 
 
 
 
Peru 
 
0.23 
 
0.49 
 
0.49 
 
-0.11 
 
-0.40 
 
1.00 
 
 
 Principal Component Analysis 
 
 
Principal Component 
 
Eigenvalue 
 
R2 
 
Cumulative R2 
 
1 
 
3.19 
 
0.53 
 
0.53 
 
2 
 
1.47 
 
0.24 
 
0.78 
 
3 
 
0.66 
 
0.11 
 
0.89 
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 Table I.6 Correlation of Domestic Saving Across the Region and Factor Analysis, 1970-1995 
 World Bank Data 
 
 
 
 
Argentin
a 
 
Chile  
 
Colombia 
 
El 
Salvador 
 
Mexico 
 
Peru 
 
Urugua
y 
 
Venezuela 
 
Argentina 
 
1.00 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chile 
 
-0.55 
 
1.00 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Colombia 
 
0.04 
 
0.42 
 
1.00 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
El 
Salvador 
 
0.83 
 
-0.53 
 
-0.08 
 
1.00 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Mexico 
 
0.02 
 
-0.26 
 
0.07 
 
-0.31 
 
1.00 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Peru 
 
0.06 
 
-0.33 
 
-0.09 
 
-0.06 
 
0.73 
 
1.00 
 
 
 
 
 
Uruguay 
 
0.15 
 
-0.38 
 
0.11 
 
0.20 
 
-0.03 
 
0.04 
 
1.00 
 
 
 
Venezuel
a 
 
0.62 
 
-0.43 
 
-0.08 
 
0.75 
 
-0.36 
 
-0.05 
 
0.16 
 
1.00 
 
 
 Principal Component Analysis 
 
 
Principal Component 
 
Eigenvalue 
 
R2 
 
Cumulative R2 
 
1 
 
3.03 
 
0.38 
 
0.38 
 
2 
 
1.99 
 
0.25 
 
0.63 
 
3 
 
1.14 
 
0.18 
 
0.77 
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 Table I.7 Correlation of Domestic Saving Across the Region and Factor Analysis, 1975-1993 
 
 
 
 
Argentina 
 
Chile 
 
Colombia 
 
El Salvador 
 
Mexico 
 
Peru 
 
Argentina 
 
1.00 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chile 
 
-0.36 
 
1.00 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Colombia 
 
0.06 
 
0.70 
 
1.00 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
El Salvador 
 
0.41 
 
0.24 
 
0.31 
 
1.00 
 
 
 
 
 
Mexico 
 
0.53 
 
-0.74 
 
-0.48 
 
0.03 
 
1.00 
 
 
 
Peru 
 
-0.14 
 
-0.36 
 
-0.42 
 
-0.37 
 
0.49 
 
1.00 
 
 
 Principal Component Analysis 
 
 
Principal Component 
 
Eigenvalue 
 
R2 
 
Cumulative R2 
 
1 
 
2.77 
 
0.46 
 
0.46 
 
2 
 
1.73 
 
0.29 
 
0.75 
 
3 
 
0.53 
 
0.09 
 
0.84 
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Table I.8. Saving and Capital Flows, 1970-1995: East Asia and Latin America 
 
 
Cyclical components of: 
 
Hodrick-Prescott Filter 
 
Kalman Filter 
 
Beveridge-Nelson Filter 
 
Domestic Saving 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Correlation 
 
0.44 
 
0.51 
 
0.40 
 
t-statistic 
 
2.17 
 
2.03 
 
1.92 
 
Foreign Saving 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Correlation 
 
0.36 
 
0.42 
 
0.46 
 
t-statistic 
 
3.43 
 
2.77 
 
2.32 
 
Source: Reinhart and Talvi (1997). 
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 Table I.9.  Public and Private Saving: Evidence on Ricardian Equivalence 
 
 
Study 
 
Country 
 
Sample period, 
frequency, and 
dependent 
variable 
 
Methodology 
 
Results 
 
Agosin, Crespi, 
and Letelier, 
(1998) 
 
Chile 
 
1975-1994, annual, 
private saving rate 
 
Johansen’s 
ECVAR 
 
Rejects Ricardian equivalence.  
Only partial substitutability is 
found.  Coefficient on public saving 
is  
-0.608.  Significantly different from 
-1.0. 
 
Cardenas and 
Escobar (1998) 
 
Colombia 
 
1929-1994, 1970-
1994, annual, 
private and 
household saving 
rates 
 
Reduced-form 
saving equation, 
OLS. 
 
Rejects Ricardian equivalence.   
Coefficient on public saving is  
-0.716 (full sample) and -0.507 
(sub-sample) for private saving and  
-0.391 (sub sample) for household 
saving.  In all cases significant. 
 
Rivera Campos 
(1998) 
 
El 
Salvador 
 
1968-1994, annual 
real private saving 
 
Consumption 
function, 
Johansen’s 
ECVAR 
 
Rejects Ricardian equivalence, real 
public saving is statistically not 
significantly different from zero, 
although the coefficient is negative, 
as expected. 
 
Japelli and 
Pagano (1998) 
 
G10, 
excluding 
Italy 
 
panel, 1960-1994, 
national saving 
rates 
 
Reduced-form 
saving equation, 
OLS and robust 
estimation 
 
Rejects Ricardian equivalence. 
Coefficient on public saving ranges 
from 0.68 to 0.73, depending on 
method of estimation and the use of 
time trends.  In all cases positive 
and significant. 
 
Gonzales, 
Lévano, and 
Llontop (1998) 
 
Peru 
 
1950-1994, annual 
 
Reduced-form 
saving equation, 
OLS  
 
Rejects Ricardian equivalence.   
Coefficient on public saving is  
-0.43 and significant. 
 
Boldrin and 
Martin (1998) 
 
Spain 
 
1964-1995, 
quarterly, percent 
change in real 
private saving 
 
Reduced-form 
saving equation, 
OLS 
 
Ricardian equivalence is not 
explicitly tested.  Fiscal measure is 
growth rate of public income.  
Coefficient is -0.40 and significant. 
 
Begg and 
Griffith-Jones 
(1998) 
 
United 
Kingdom 
 
1963-1995, annual 
 
Reduced-form 
saving equation, 
Instrumental 
variables 
 
Coefficient on public saving is -
0.46 in the household saving 
equation.  Yet, when public saving 
is the dependent variable, the 
coefficient on household saving is 
not different from unity. 
 
Noya, Lorenzo, 
Grau-Pérez 
(1998) 
 
Uruguay 
 
1975:1-1994:4, 
quarterly, private 
consumption 
 
Consumption 
function, 
Johansen’s 
ECVAR 
 
Rejects Ricardian equivalence.   
Coefficients are not reported, but 
the χ2 statistic on the restrictions on 
the coefficients of public 
consumption, revenue, and debt in 
the VAR. 
 
Zambrano, 
Riutort, Muñoz, 
Guevara (1998) 
 
Venezuel
a 
 
1968-1994, annual, 
private 
consumption 
 
Consumption, 
function, 
Johansen’s 
ECVAR 
 
Rejects Ricardian equivalence.   
Coefficients are not reported, but 
the χ2 statistic on the restrictions on 
the coefficients of public 
consumption, revenue, and debt in 
the VAR. 
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 Table I.10  How Prevalent are Liquidity Constraints? 
 
 
Study 
 
 
+Country 
 
Sample 
period, 
frequency, 
and 
dependent 
variable 
 
Methodology 
 
Results 
 
López- 
Murphy, 
Navajas, 
Urbiztondo, 
Moskovitz 
(1998) 
 
Argentina 
 
1960-1994, 
annual 
national 
saving rate 
 
ECM, variant 
of Feldstein-
Horioka 
 
There is a significant and positive relationship 
between saving and investment through 1989, 
becoming insignificant in the 1990s.  
Argentina’s renewed entry into international 
capital markets is thought to account for this 
structural shift. 
 
Cardenas 
and Escobar 
(1998) 
 
Colombia 
 
1985-1993, 
annual, 397 
firms, saving 
by firms 
 
OLS 
 
Finds firms propensity to save out of profits fell 
following financial reform.  Cash flow and 
saving decisions are independent after reforms. 
 
Agosin, 
Crespi, and 
Letelier, 
(1998) 
 
Chile, 
micro 
data from 
196 firms 
 
panel, 1986-
1994, annual, 
saving by 
firm 
 
OLS, and 
robust 
estimation 
 
Finds evidence that firms are liquidity 
constrained in that they have to rely on retained 
earnings to finance their investment projects. 
 
Japelli and 
Pagano 
(1998) 
 
Italy 
 
N.A. 
 
Discussion and 
stylized 
evidence  
 
Based on their earlier studies, they present 
evidence, as to the role of liquidity in keeping 
saving rates high in Italy relative to other OECD 
countries and the role of financial liberalization 
in explaining their recent decline. 
 
Calderón-
Madrid 
(1998) 
 
Mexico, 
micro 
data  
household 
survey 
 
1989, 1992, 
1994, 
household 
saving rates 
 
OLS 
 
Access to credit reduces household saving.  The 
coefficient on a dummy variable that takes on 
the value of one if the household had access to 
credit ranges from -0.245 for 1989 to -0.16 for 
1992. 
 
Gonzales, 
Lévano, and 
Llontop 
(1998) 
 
Peru 
 
1950-1994, 
annual 
 
ECM  
 
Growth in credit to the private sector is not 
significant in explaining the growth in real 
private saving. 
 
Begg and 
Griffith-
Jones (1998) 
 
United 
Kingdom 
 
N.A. 
 
Discussion of 
previous 
studies 
 
From the review of six studies on the UK, the 
balance of the results (four of the six) attach an 
important role to financial deregulation in 
explaining the decline in U.K. saving rates. 
 
Noya, 
Lorenzo, 
Grau-Pérez 
(1998) 
 
Uruguay 
 
1975:1-
1994:4, 
quarterly, 
private 
consumption 
growth 
 
Instrumental 
variables, 
Campbell and 
Mankiw (1989) 
approach 
 
The find that the proportion of liquidity 
constrained households is in the 0.39 to 0.49 
range.  Furthermore, they  find that introducing 
credit significantly  reduces the coefficient on 
current income.  Yet, using dummy variables, 
they find no evidence that the dependence of 
consumption on income is lower in the post-
financial liberalization period. 
 
Zambrano, 
Riutort, 
Muñoz, 
Guevara 
(1998) 
 
Venezuel
a 
 
1968-1994, 
annual, 
growth 
consumption 
 
GMM, 
Campbell and 
Mankiw (1989) 
approach 
 
They find that the proportion of liquidity 
constrained households is in the 0.355 to 0.534, 
depending on whether durable goods were 
included in the consumption measure or not. 
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 Table I.11.  Consumption Booms and Durable Goods 
 
Study 
 
Country 
 
Sample period, 
frequency, and 
dependent 
variable 
 
Methodology 
 
Results 
 
López Murphy, 
Navajas, 
Urbiztondo, 
Moskovitz 
(1998) 
 
Argentina 
 
1960-1994, annual 
growth in 
consumption of 
durable goods 
 
ECM 
 
The authors weigh and test 
competing models to explain the 
boom in durable good consumption 
following the Convertibility Plan.  
They find that the decline in 
nominal interest rates, rise in 
salaries (in US dollars) and the 
decline in the price of durable 
goods all help explain the boom, 
suggesting both intertemporal, 
intratemporal, and wealth effects. 
 
Calderón-
Madrid (1998) 
 
Mexico, 
micro 
data from 
household 
survey 
 
1989, 1992, 1994 
 
OLS  
 
The results suggest that 
consumption boom following the 
inflation stabilization and financial 
liberalization had much to do with 
greater access to credit and an asset 
(particularly housing) price boom, 
which allowed households to 
borrow using their real estate as 
collateral. 
 
Boldrin and 
Martin (1998) 
 
Spain 
 
1964-1995, 
quarterly, percent 
change in real 
private saving 
 
Descriptive and 
OLS 
 
A consumption boom followed the 
trade and financial sector 
liberalization in 1986.  Based on 
their model they conclude revisions 
to expected permanent income can 
account for much of the boom. 
 
Begg and 
Griffith-Jones 
(1998) 
 
United 
Kingdom 
 
N.A. 
 
Literature review 
 
Compare two competing hypotheses 
to explain the consumption boom in 
the xx.  The two are easier access to 
credit versus revised expectations of 
future income.  Empirical studies 
inconclusive, although the financial 
liberalization/credit channel 
received more weight. 
 
Noya, Lorenzo, 
Grau-Pérez 
(1998) 
 
Uruguay 
 
1975:1-1994:4, 
quarterly, private 
consumption 
 
Instrumental 
variables 
 
In explaining the 1990 post-
stabilization boom, the study finds 
that more rapid income growth, 
increased credit availability and 
lower interest rates all contributed 
to  explanation the boom. 
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 Table I.12  Do Capital Inflows Crowd Out Domestic Saving? 
 
Study 
 
Country 
 
Sample period, 
frequency, and 
dependent 
variable 
 
Methodology 
 
Results 
 
López Murphy, 
Navajas, 
Urbiztondo, 
Moskovitz 
(1998) 
 
Argentina 
 
1960-1994, annual 
national saving 
rate 
 
Pairwise correlation 
 
The authors report a correlation 
with foreign saving of -0.33. 
 
Agosin, Crespi, 
and Letelier, 
(1998) 
 
Chile 
 
1975-1994, annual, 
private saving rate 
 
Johansen’s ECVAR 
 
 Coefficient on foreign saving 
rate is -1.116.  Cannot reject 
that there is full offset (i.e., not 
significantly different from  
-1.0.) 
 
Cardenas and 
Escobar (1998) 
 
Colombia 
 
1929-1994, 1970-
1994, annual, 
private and 
household saving 
rates 
 
 
Reduced-form saving 
equation, OLS. 
 
 Coefficient on foreign saving 
rate is -0.36 (full sample) and  
-0.395 (sub-sample) for private 
saving and -0.316 (sub sample) 
for household saving.  In all 
cases significant. 
 
Rivera Campos 
 (1998) 
 
El 
Salvador  
 
panel, 1968-1994, 
real private saving 
 
Johansen’s ECVAR  
 
Ambiguous sign, depending on 
which cointegrating vector is 
used. 
 
Gonzales, 
Lévano, and 
Llontop (1998) 
 
Peru 
 
1950-1994, annual, 
private saving rate 
 
OLS  
 
Coefficient on foreign saving is 
-0.37 and significant. 
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 Table I.13.  Evidence on the Links Between Growth and Saving 
 
Study 
 
Country 
 
Sample period, 
frequency, and 
dependent 
variable(s) 
 
Methodology 
 
Results 
 
Agosin, Crespi, 
and Letelier, 
(1998) 
 
Chile 
 
1960-1994, annual, 
private saving rate 
and private 
investment/GDP 
ratio, also growth 
rates and levels per 
capita 
 
bivariate VAR 
 
No direct tests on growth are 
performed, but in all the 
specifications there is a 
unidirectional causal relationship 
from investment to saving. 
 
Cardenas and 
Escobar (1998) 
 
Colombia 
 
1929-1994, annual, 
10-year averages 
in private saving 
rates and GDP 
growth (as well as 
their permanent 
components) 
 
bivariate VAR 
 
No causal relationships are detected 
when 10-year averages are used.   
When permanent components are 
used there is a significant two-way 
causality. 
 
Rivera Campos 
(1998) 
 
El 
Salvador 
 
1968-1994, annual 
real private saving 
 
Descriptive 
analysis 
 
While no causality tests are 
performed, the stylized evidence 
poinst to a positive link between 
saving and growth. 
 
Japelli and 
Pagano (1998) 
 
G10, 
excluding 
Italy 
 
panel, 1960-1994, 
national saving 
rates 
 
Reduced-form 
saving equation, 
OLS and robust 
estimation 
 
While no two-way causality tests 
are performed, growth is a 
significant determinant of saving in 
all specifications and estimation 
strategies. 
 
Boldrin and 
Martin (1998) 
 
Spain 
 
1964-1995, 
quarterly, national 
or private saving 
rate and GDP 
growth 
 
bivariate VAR 
 
Pairwise correlations are high for 
national saving (0.69) but there is 
no evidence of a causal relationship 
running in either direction.  This 
result is robust to using levels of the 
variables.  
 
Zambrano, 
Riutort, Muñoz, 
Guevara (1998) 
 
Venezuel
a 
 
1968-1994, annual, 
private saving rate 
GDP growth 
including and 
excluding oil 
 
Bivariate VAR 
 
There is a significant (at the 10% 
level) causal relationship running 
from growth to saving irrespective 
of the measure of GDP used.  There 
is no causal relationship from 
saving to GDP. 
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 Table I.14.  Life-Cycle Hypothesis and Saving 
 
 
Study 
 
Country 
 
Sample period, 
frequency, and 
dependent 
variable 
 
Methodology 
 
Results 
 
Cardenas and 
Escobar (1998) 
 
Colombia 
 
1929-1994, 1970-
1994, annual, 
private saving rate 
 
Reduced-form 
saving equation, 
OLS. 
 
The age dependency ratio is 
significant in all specifications. Its 
coefficient is -0.27 (full sample) 
and increasingly important in the 
more recent period; the range is -
2.44 to 
 -1.905 (sub-sample). 
 
Japelli and 
Pagano (1998) 
 
Italy, 
micro 
data on 
household 
saving 
 
1984, 1986, 1987, 
1989, 1991, and 
1993 
household saving 
rates 
 
Descriptive 
analysis 
 
The authors conclude that the 
evidence in the micro data does not 
provide support for the LCH in 
explaining the decline in aggregate 
saving.  The decline in the 
propensity to save is evident across 
all age groups. 
 
Calderón-
Madrid (1998) 
 
Mexico, 
micro 
data on 
household 
survey 
 
1989, 1992, 1994 
 
OLS  
 
In contrast to the predictions of the 
LCH, the number of children per 
household aged 12 or less and heads 
of households aged 65 or older 
(eldest group) were either not 
significant or were significant with 
a positive sign.    
 
Gonzales, 
Lévano, and 
Llontop (1998) 
 
Peru 
 
1950-1994, annual, 
real private saving  
 
Johansen’s 
ECVAR 
 
The inverse of the dependency ratio 
is part of the cointegrating vector.  
Consistent with the LCH, the 
coefficient ranges from 0.297 to 
0.427, depending on sample period. 
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 Table I.15.  Other Determinants of Saving 
 
Study 
 
Country 
 
Sample period, 
frequency, and 
dependent 
variable 
 
Methodolog
y 
 
Results 
 
Income 
distribution: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Calderón-
Madrid (1998) 
 
Mexico, 
micro 
data from 
household 
survey 
 
1989, 1992, 1994 
 
OLS  
 
While the explanatory  variable does not 
directly measure household income, it is 
years of education.  Presumably education 
and income levels are positively related.  
He finds more educated households save 
less.  The interpretation given is that these 
household heads have access to credit, 
while less educated households heads do 
not.    
 
Boldrin and 
Martin (1998) 
 
Spain 
 
1964-1995, 
quarterly, 
percent change 
in real private 
saving 
 
OLS 
 
Their proxy for income distribution, the 
share of gross profit margin over total value 
added, has a positive coefficient, but it is 
not statistically significant. 
 
Zambrano, 
Riutort, 
Muñoz, 
Guevara (1998) 
 
Venezuel
a 
 
1968-1994, 
annual, private 
consumption 
 
Johansen’s 
ECVAR 
 
Find no statistical evidence, that their proxy 
for income distribution affects saving. 
 
Terms of 
trade: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
López Murphy, 
Navajas, 
Urbiztondo, 
Moskovitz 
(1998) 
 
Argentina 
 
1960-1994, 
annual 
national saving 
rate 
 
Pairwise 
correlation 
 
The correlation between the terms of trade 
and saving is not statistically significant 
0.03. 
 
Rivera Campos 
(1998) 
 
El 
Salvador 
 
1968-1994, 
annual 
real private 
saving 
 
Johansen’s 
ECVAR 
 
The terms of trade affect long run saving 
positively, are significant and are a 
component of the cointegrating vector.  
Furthermore, terms of trade changes 
significantly affect the short-run dynamics 
of saving. 
 
Gonzales, 
Lévano, and 
Llontop (1998) 
 
Peru 
 
1950-1994, 
annual, real 
private saving  
 
Johansen’s 
ECVAR 
 
The terms of trade affect long run saving 
positively, are significant and are a 
component of the cointegrating vector.  
Changes in these do not influence 
significantly the short-run dynamics of 
saving. 
 
Zambrano, 
Riutort, 
Muñoz, 
Guevara (1998) 
 
Venezuel
a 
 
1968-1994, 
annual, private 
consumption 
 
Johansen’s 
ECVAR 
The terms of trade are significant and are a 
component of the cointegrating vector.  
Furthermore, terms of trade changes 
significantly affect the short-run dynamics 
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of saving. 
 
